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ABSTRACT
The complexity of space-based systems makes
monitoring them and diagnosing their faults taxing for
human beings. Mission control operators are well-
trained experts but they can not afford to have their
attention diverted by extraneous information. During
normal operating conditions monitoring the status of the
components of a complex system alone is a big task.
When a problem arises, immediate attention and quick
resolution is mandatory. To aid humans in these
endeavors we have developed an automated advisory
system. Our advisory expert system, Trouble, incor-
porates the knowledge of the power system designers
for Space Station Freedom. Trouble is designed to be a
ground-based advisor for the mission controllers in the
Control Center Complex at Johnson Space Center
(JSC). It has been developed at NASA Lewis Research
Center (LeRC) and tested in conjunction with prototype
flight hardware contained in the Power Management
and Distribution testbed and the Engineering Support
Center, ESC, at LeRC. Our work will culminate with
the adoption of these techniques by the mission
controllers at JSC. This paper elucidates how we have
captured power system failure knowledge, how we have
built and tested our expert system, and what we believe
are its potential uses.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
We have developed an expert system, Trouble, as a
ground-based advisory system. Its purpose is to aid the
humans whose job it is to monitor and diagnose faults
in the Space Station Freedom Electric Power System.
Trouble provides a graphical status-at-a-glance screen
for ease in monitoring the power system. When an
anomaly occurs, the operator is alerted to the
location of the problem as well as being presented
with the possible causes of the malfunction.
Developed as one of the projects of the Power
System Advanced Automation Lab located at
LeRC, Trouble is an object-oriented expert system
built using LISP and the ART (Automated
Reasoning Tool from Inference Corporation)
inference engine. By connecting Trouble to the DC
Power Management and Distribution Testbed at
LeRC, live data can be used to test Trouble for
accuracy. Integrated into the Engineering Support
Center, Trouble simulates backroom EPS ground
operations when Space Station Freedom is
operational.
_.0 FAILURE KNOWLEDGE CAPTURE
One of Trouble's unique features is its set-
covering approach to storing failure knowledge and
system configuration. This approach maintains a
readable and easily reconfigurable data dictionary
to encode the failures and their component relation-
ships) This data dictionary is populated with the
information captured by a failure modes and effect
analysis, FMEA, a standard engineering process.
Most system development today includes an FMEA
describing possible failures for each component and
how failures propagate through the system.
Trouble uses this failure data to search backwards
from the effects to their causes rather than forward
from the causes to the effects.
Copyright ¢ 1993 by the American Institute of Aeronautics
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3.0 FAILURE KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION
A generic object is made for all similar
components. Our current representation includes
components for the power distribution as well as power
generation and storage. These components are cables,
busses, remote bus isolators (RBI), remote power
converters (R.PC), DC to DC convertor units (DDCU),
battery charge discharge units (BCDU), solar arrays and
batteries. Each component type has its own attribute
list that contains the important characteristics for that
type of device. These attributes include such things as
input voltage, output voltage, current, setpoint limits,
state of the device, interconneetions, etc. The individual
components are instances of the generic object and
inherit its attributes.
The failure knowledge is also stored in the generic
object representation. 2 This failure knowledge, obtained
from a FMEA, is stored in the failure data dictionary
which enumerates all known causes, their subcauses,
their sub-subcauses, etc. To simplify the search for
possible causes, we do'not store a completely connected
failure tree. We store each object as a related triple;
failure, cause and symptom, and only generate linkages
for those failures whose symptoms have been detected.
The linked failure chains form the basis for
Trouble's advisory screens, providing an operator with
a complete set of reasoning from the detection of an
anomaly to all the known causes. This approach
provides the operator with the full set of relevant
knowledge, much like a reference in an encyclopedia.
In critical situations, a list of all known causes is very
helpful since operators might overlook unusual or
highly unlikely failure causes when they are pressed for
time. Mission controllers at the Johnson Spa_ Center
expressed interest in this particular feature. They want
an automated advisory system to provide relevant
information and let the human draw the conclusions.
Trouble is a multi-process diagnostic expert
system made up of the following independent
subsystems: data acquisition, symptom detection,
diagnosis and graphical user interface. Data acqui-
sition is responsible for reading telemetry data and
updating objects. Symptom detection is a set of
complex rules that determines whether or not any
anomalies are present in the system and, if so,
generates symptoms. Diagnosis is responsible for
using the generated symptoms to search the failure
data dictionary to find causes for the anomaly. The
graphical user interface communicates with the
operator. Each process is independent, and
interactions between processes are limited to simple
exchanges of results. To reduce processing time,
diagnosis and detection are performed only when
needed. The two other modules operate
continuously.
4.1 Data Acquisition
To reason about the system and to perform
diagnostics, Trouble's data objects must use the
most recent data. During each sampling period,
measurements are stored in the corresponding
component. Trouble then compares this data to the
last set of collected data. If the two sets are within
tolerance, no new information is present and no
further processing is required. If the changes are
not within tolerance, the detection process is begun.
4.2 Detection
The essence of detection is the conversion of
quantitative measurements into qualitative
symptoms that describe the system's performance.
The goal of detection is the generation of the
symptoms that provide the link between telemetry
data and failure modes, since each linkage in the
failure chain is accessed by its corresponding
symptom. When the detection module executes, it
runs a set of rules which look for predefined patterns in
the data which indicate an anomaly. If there is a match
in the data, symptoms are generated. There can be
multiple symptoms for a particular anomaly pattern, as
well as multiple patterns for a particular symptom.
The complexity in Trouble resides in the detector
rules. Rules are difficult to maintain, hard to read and
hard to verify. We intentionally limited application
specific rules in Trouble to the detection task alone.
Determining how to detect a particular failure is
challenging. Experts can explain how a device might
fail, what might be the cause as well as specify how to
detect the failure. Unfortunately, many power system
hardware components do not have instrumentation that
allows the ground system to detect certain problems. To
be able to make such a specific judgement, special tests
may need to be run or collateral information gathered.
An operator on the ground will be able to make those
choices because Trouble provides all known possible
causes of an anomaly, even if some are highly unlikely.
4.3 Diagnostics
Trouble's set-covering technique is encapsulated in
the diagnostic process where the detected symptoms are
matched to failure knowledge. The data dictionary
representation facilitates modification to the failure
knowledge since the knowledge can be read in its stored
format, a data table. Tables are easy to change, thus the
actual software is easy to maintain as well. The
diagnostic process begins with a search of the failure
database. The failure database stores its knowledge as
failure objects which are related triples; failure mode,
cause and symptom. The database search process finds
all failure objects containing the detected symptoms.
When a symptom match is made, a special data record
is created. This is the failure hypothesis record or FHR,
which contains information about a single link in the
failure mode tree. The FHR contains the failed
device's name, the time, the detecting device's name as
well as the specific failure mode with its possible cause.
The FHRs are connected into linked-lists incorporating
the parent-child nature of failures, their causes, and
subcauses. Each linked-list represents a path
through the failure tree from the top failure down
to the root cause.
The diagnostic process generates complete
failure paths for every anomaly detected at a
particular instant in time. Trouble presents each
anomaly and all of its potential root causes. In this
fashion, Trouble presents its entire knowledge of
the state of the power system for the operator's
perusal.
4.4 Human Interface
An advisory system must present its
information in a way that is easy for a human to
understand and to manipulate. Ground operators
are busy people and it is our job to make their lives
easier. Trouble knows the current state of the
power system whether it is operating within
tolerances or not. It has information on the causes
of any anomalies both past and present. The
interface design emphasizes the location of
information, the format of that information and the
amount of human manipulation required to access
information. We consulted with David Woods, a
human factors expert from Ohio State University,
before beg_g the screen development. 3 With
his help, we used functional decomposition to
define screen requirements. We began by asking:
"What does the power system do and how
important are the various functions?" In this
fashion we defined a hierarchy of importance for
power system functions. We then used a function's
importance to select size, color, and brightness for
its icons. Those that represented very important
functions became brighter than their less important
neighbors.
We found that our interface had two separate
yet related tasks: monitor the power system at all
times and effectively present diagnostic
information. In order to monitor a system, an
operator needs to know where the system is operating
in order to take action to prevent failures from
occurring and interrupting power to the station. Our
status-at-a-glance screen was created for this purpose.
For a further discussion of this screen and its icons, see
Liberman, et al. 4
The second interface task was to present the
diagnostic information in an effective manner. Our
experiences led us to building a set of text screens to
present this information. Operators will have varying
levels of experience and we wanted to provide optional
levels of detail to support different levels of expertise.
As such we have three separate text screens. The first
and smallest screen contains the minimum required
data; where the problem is, when we found it, which
device detected it and what kind of anomaly did we
have. For an experienced operator and for a simple
problem this information may be all that is desired.
However, if the operator chooses to click on any
particular anomaly in that window another window will
appear which contains further diagnostic information.
This window repeats the anomaly description data of the
previous window adding all the possible root causes for
that problem. These causes may be sufficient for
determining what actions might be taken to identify the
specific source of the problem and initiating corrective
actions. However, if the operators want to question the
reasoning tI_ Trouble used to make those root cause
associations, they can click on any line in the second
window and a third window will open. This window
contains all of Trouble's information about that
particular anomaly. It details the main problem and all
of the associated causes and subcauses that apply.
Operators can use this level of detail to rule out poten-
tial causes that they deem are too unlikely to have
occurred, or perhaps takes steps to acquire corollary
information that would substantiate one of these as the
true cause of the failure.
4.50veratin_ Environment
We developed Trouble by interrogating the power
system engineers who test the prototype flight power
system component hardware. This information
produced our FMEA data and became the focus of
our integrated testing of Trouble. Connected
directly to the PMAD testbed, Trouble is able to
detect and diagnose failures from live hardware.
This testing effort served as our method of
validation for the knowledge in Trouble. It also
presented us with software challenges with respect
to networking and data requirements. Another
challenge has been the constant reconfiguration of
the power system hardware as it has been tracking
the changes within the Space Station program. Due
to the data dictionary design, accommodating these
changes has been relatively easy.
When the Engineering Support Center became
operational, we integrated into that environment,
simulating a ground operations environment similar
to that at the Control Center Complex, CCC, at
NASA JSC. We simulate flight operations for the
EPS back room using the PMAD tes_ as the
substitute for the Space Station. It is our goal to
utilize the methodologies in Trouble as a
cornerstone of an EPS operations console for the
CCC.
5.0 AN EXAMPLE
The operator is monitoring the EPS and sees an
anomaly message on the screen. The message is
"SA2.2 detected Over Current Trip at 0:31:40".
SA22 is an RPC in the secondary power
distribution network from whom power flows into
three channels through three tertiary RPCs; TA24,
TA25 and TA26. Immediately the operator checks
the status-at-a-glance screen and determines the
breaker is in a tripped state and that power is not
flowing through SA22. Searching for possibilities,
the operator clicks on the anomaly message and
receives a list of all the possible causes. In this
there are nine locations where failures might
have occurred. Four of these locations are the
lines connecting SA22, TA24, TA25 and TA26 to
the tertiary distribution bus. Each line has one
4
possiblecause,a low resistance path leaking power
from the line to ground. Four of the failure locations
are the RPCs themselves. Each tertiary RPCs has one
possible cause, an internal hard short before the current
sensor. The secondary RPC (which is the tripped
breaker) has three possible causes; over current trip
level too low, failure of trip electronics or internal hard
short after the current sensor. The last possible failure
location is the tertiary bus which has four possibilities;
load drawing more current than scheduled, too many
loads scheduled, closed breaker allowing non scheduled
loads to run and the existence of a low resistance path
leaking power from the bus to ground. The operator
believes that it is unlikely that there is a resistance path
to ground in any of the lines, or an internal short in the
tertiary RPC. The operator decides to investigate the
load history on that tertiary bus, believing load fluctua-
tions to be the most likely cause of the problem. Once
the cause of this failure is established, corrective action
can be taken to restore power to the affected area.
6.0. CONCLUSION
Operating the EPS for Space Station Freedom will
be a difficult and human intensive task. We have built
an advisory expert system to aid the human operators in
monitoring and diagnosing faults in the power system.
Our advisory system, Trouble, demonstrates that our
concepts are viable. It is our goal to develop an
advisory system based on this work to be incorporated
in the JSC Control Center Complex.
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